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People who are high in victim-sensitivity—a personality trait characterized by a strong
fear of being exploited by others—are more likely to attend to social cues associated
with untrustworthiness rather than to cues associated with trustworthiness compared
with people who are low in victim-sensitivity. But how do these people react when
an initial expectation regarding a target’s trustworthiness turns out to be false?
Results from two studies show that victim-sensitive compared with victim-insensitive
individuals show enhanced source memory and greater change in person perception
for negatively labeled targets that violated rather than confirmed negative expectations
(the “trustworthy trickster”). These findings are in line with recent theorizing on schema
inconsistency and expectancy violation effects in social cognition and with research on
the different facets of justice sensitivity in personality psychology.
Keywords: expectancy violation, fear of exploitation, memory, trustworthiness, victim sensitivity
INTRODUCTION
Cooperation between individuals requires mutual trust. If person A is in dire straits and asks person
B to lend him or her some money, then A should trust that B will not exploit A’s state of emergency,
and B should trust that A will eventually pay the money back. Neither person can be sure that this is
actually the case; this makes the described exchange fundamentally uncertain. This is the paradox of
trust (Yamagishi, 2001): the more uncertain a situation, the more trust is required, but—at the same
time—the more difficult it is to decide whether one’s interaction partner is actually trustworthy.
Humans have a fundamental aversion to being exploited by others. However, this aversion is
stronger for some people than for others: People who are victim-sensitive harbor a latent fear of
being exploited and react particularly strongly toward experiences of unfairness (Gollwitzer et al.,
2005, 2013; Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2009). Because the possibility of exploitation is aversive
and present in many contexts, people are well advised to trust others only when there is reason
to do so. Stated differently, whenever a specific social situation entails cues suggesting that one’s
interaction partner is not trustworthy, then trust becomes riskier and, thus, less likely. It is therefore
highly functional (in particular for people aversive to exploitation) to attend to cues that are
informative about another person’s untrustworthiness, and research shows that people actually do
use these cues before they make a trustworthiness decision (e.g., Zebrowitz and Montepare, 2008;
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Gollwitzer et al., 2009; Todorov et al., 2009). Such cues include
current behavioral cues such as the things a person says, the way
he or she looks, or their facial expression, as well as information
about a person’s past behavior, reputation, or background.
Negative social labels, in particular, can be used to quickly form
an impression about an interaction partner, and to guide social
behaviors. However, these social labels may fail to do justice to
each individual. A person who is said to be a trickster (i.e., a
negative social label) is possibly regarded as untrustworthy, but
may turn out to actually be a very nice and helpful person.
Therefore, it can be considered functional to attend to negative
social labels because they provide a quick orientation in a
complex social environment, but it is also important to remember
information that is inconsistent with these labels, and to integrate
it in one’s judgment. The present study examines what happens
when an untrustworthiness-related cue turns out to be invalid:
would victim-sensitive participants with their strong fear of
exploitation be able to remember that a trickster turns out to be
trustworthy? Or would they show an inflexible memory bias for
untrustworthy behavior?
In Study 1 we will show that, perhaps counterintuitively
so, victim-sensitive compared with victim-insensitive individuals
indeed have a memory advantage for the trustworthy (but not
for the untrustworthy) trickster. In Study 2 we will show that
victim sensitivity also has an asymmetric effect on people’s person
perception: Victim-sensitive compared with victim-insensitive
participants update their trustworthiness perceptions about the
trustworthy trickster more strongly than about the untrustworthy
trickster, whereas the updating of another type of expectancy-
inconsistent target (e.g., the untrustworthy scientist) is not
influenced by victim sensitivity. These findings are incompatible
with the notion of a “cheater detection module” (Cosmides,
1989), but they can be well explained by modern schema
inconsistency and expectancy violation theories, as will be
described in the following.
VICTIM SENSITIVITY AND EXPECTANCY
VIOLATION
Victim sensitivity is a self-directed concern for justice
characterized by a fear of being exploited. It predicts less
pro- and more anti-social behavior (Gollwitzer et al., 2005).
Past research has demonstrated that victim sensitivity is a highly
stable personality trait (Schmitt et al., 2005) and has documented
its location in the personality space (for the relationships with
jealousy, just-world beliefs, or Machiavellianism, see Schmitt
et al., 2005; for the relationships with the Big Five personality
traits, see Schmitt et al., 2010). According to the Sensitivity to
Mean Intentions (SeMI) model (Gollwitzer and Rothmund,
2009), victim-sensitive individuals are specifically sensitive to
contextual cues that are associated with meanness, recklessness,
and untrustworthiness. In social dilemma situations—that are
typically characterized by some degree of uncertainty concerning
one’s partners’ intentions—victim-sensitive individuals expect
to be exploited and thus tend to defect (Gollwitzer et al., 2009).
Hence, some of the uncooperative and anti-social behaviors
displayed by people high in victim sensitivity can be understood
as a means to protect themselves from (assumed) victimization.
Whereas previous studies have primarily focused (1) on
the cognitive schemas (i.e., untrustworthiness expectations) that
victim-sensitive individuals apply in social situations and (2)
on the behavioral consequences of victim sensitivity in these
situations, the present study will be the first to investigate the
effect of being confronted with schema-incongruent information
on source memory and person perception. In other words, the
following questions will be addressed by the present studies:
Do expectancy violations have a source memory advantage for
victim-sensitive individuals? Are victim-sensitive compared with
victim-insensitive individuals more influenced by a violation of
positive or negative expectations? And do they update their
cognitive schemas accordingly?
CHEATER DETECTION AND
EXPECTANCY VIOLATION
According to evolutionary psychologists, the analysis of
evolutionary pressures is essential for understanding how the
human mind works. One such pressure is the maintenance of
social exchange within larger groups of non-kin, as cooperation
between unrelated individuals is prone to be exploited by
cheaters. Thus, the ability to identify and remember people who
cannot be trusted is considered particularly adaptive (Cosmides
and Tooby, 1989, 2005); hence, many authors argue in favor of
the existence of a specialized cognitive module devoted to the
detection of, and memory for, cheaters. Indeed, there is some
empirical evidence that supports the assumption of a specialized
“cheater detection module” (Mealey et al., 1996; Oda, 1997).
Other findings, however, speak against the existence of a
specialized cheater detection module and are in favor of more
general mechanisms (Bell and Buchner, 2012): in the area of
memory research, participants usually show enhanced memory
for the violation of both positive and negative expectancies
(Barclay, 2008; Bell et al., 2010, 2012, 2015; Suzuki and Suga, 2010;
Mieth et al., 2016). Thus, human memory is indeed adaptive, but
even more strongly than suggested. In line with an evolutionary
account, memory for cheaters is quite good in contexts in
which cooperation is the norm and cheating is unexpected.
However, this pattern flips when the context changes participants’
expectations. For example, in cooperation games with very low
cooperation rates trustworthy individuals are particularly well
remembered (Barclay, 2008; Bell et al., 2010). These findings
suggest that enhanced cheater memory is best explained in terms
of an expectancy violation or schema inconsistency account.
The schema-plus-tag model (Graesser and Nakamura, 1982),
for example, states that memory discrimination for schema-
consistent information is poor because schema-consistent
information is always produced at test, whether it was actually
present at encoding or not. According to this model, memory
discrimination for the untrustworthy behavior of a trickster
would be poor because untrustworthiness is already part of the
negative stereotype of a trickster, and is copied into the memory
trace (guessed), regardless of whether it was actually present
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at encoding or not. Schema-inconsistent information (e.g., a
trustworthy behavior of a trickster), in contrast, is stored in
memory in the form of tags.
It is therefore an open question how memory accuracy for
different social targets is affected by victim sensitivity. How do
victim-sensitive individuals process information that violates or
confirms their negative social expectations about a particular
target? Based on what is known so far, two patterns of results
are conceivable. On the one hand, if the perception of, and
memory for, cheaters was driven by experienced negativity (as
the “cheater detection” literature would suggest), then individuals
who are victim-sensitive should be more influenced in their
judgment and have enhanced memory for cheaters (as they
experience stronger emotional reactions toward learning that
someone is truly untrustworthy) than individuals who are less
victim-sensitive.
On the other hand, if the perception of, and memory for,
cheaters was driven rather by schema inconsistency than by
negativity (as the current state of memory research suggests),
then a different pattern should be expected. Untrustworthy
behavior is already a part of the negative stereotypes associated
with negative social labels. Therefore it does not change
one’s attitude toward that target and does not have to be
remembered separately. Learning that a dubious target has
acted truly trustworthily, however, comes as a much bigger
surprise to people who fear exploitation than to those who
do not, as the former hold much more negative expectations
toward such targets in the first place. Thus, if individuals’
memory is particularly good for schema-inconsistent behaviors,
then a stronger fear of exploitation should cause better source
memory for targets violating negative expectancies than for
targets confirming negative expectancies. Likewise, we would
expect victim sensitivity to predict a greater change in the
perception of targets violating negative expectancies than in
the perception of targets confirming negative expectancies. Put
more bluntly, victim-sensitive compared with victim-insensitive
individuals should remember the untrustworthy behavior of a
trickster particularly poorly because the untrustworthiness of
this target is already part of the negative stereotype while the
atypical trustworthy information about the trickster should be
remembered particularly well. The current state of research on
memory for cheaters and non-cheaters suggests that enhanced
memory is most likely to be driven by schema inconsistency (see
Bell and Buchner, 2012); thus, we consider the latter pattern of
results to be more likely.
RESEARCH OVERVIEW
The present research aims to investigate how victim-sensitive
individuals compared with victim-insensitive individuals
perceive and memorize targets with negative or positive social
labels when these targets supposedly did something that was
inconsistent with their respective label. Based on the theorizing
presented above, it is predicted that victim-sensitive individuals
hold more negative expectations toward targets associated with
negative social labels, which should influence the classification
of these targets in a subsequent memory test in two ways. First,
victim-sensitive compared with victim-insensitive individuals
should rely heavily on their biased expectations when memory
is not available. In consequence, they should show a more
pronounced bias toward guessing that targets with negative
social labels were previously associated with untrustworthy
behavior. Second, regarding memory accuracy, it is predicted
that victim sensitivity is associated with enhanced memory for
violations, but not for confirmations, of negative expectations.
Third, it is predicted that victim-sensitive individuals are
more likely to update their trustworthiness perceptions for
negative expectancy violations, but not for negative expectancy
confirmations.
Predictions regarding violations of positive expectations are
less straightforward. Past research has shown that both victim-
sensitive and victim-insensitive individuals react similarly to
cues of trustworthiness (Gollwitzer et al., 2012). Hence, their
expectations regarding targets with positive social labels (i.e.,
“scientist”) are not expected to differ. However, violations of
these positive expectations might pose a greater threat to victim-
sensitive individuals, thereby affecting memory and person
perception more strongly. Thus, whereas initial expectations
toward these targets should not be influenced by victim sensitivity
(and thus a pure expectancy violation account would not predict
an effect of victim sensitivity on memory and perception for such
cases), it is conceivable that the trustworthiness violation itself is
stronger for people high in victim sensitivity (which would imply
an effect of victim sensitivity also in cases of a violation of positive
expectations).
These hypotheses were tested in two studies. Study 1 examined
the influence of victim sensitivity on source memory. To
that end, participants viewed faces that were accompanied
by a positive (e.g., scientist, firefighter) or negative social
label (e.g., trickster, former prisoner). After a short delay this
information was complemented with a behavioral description
that represented either prosocial (i.e., trustworthy) or antisocial
(i.e., untrustworthy) behavior. After viewing these profiles,
participants completed a surprise source memory test in which
they viewed faces and indicated whether a face had been
presented before, and, if so, whether it was paired with
trustworthy or untrustworthy behavior. It is predicted that
participants high in victim sensitivity compared to participants
low in victim sensitivity have more negative social expectations
toward targets with negative social labels, which is reflected in a
bias toward guessing (i.e., in the absence of memory about the
correct behavior) that faces with negative labels are associated
with untrustworthy behavior. This finding would be consistent
with prior research showing that victim-sensitive individuals rely
particularly strongly on untrustworthiness cues (Gollwitzer et al.,
2012). Importantly, these negative social expectations should
result in particularly good source memory for the violation of
negative expectations; that is, for negatively labeled targets who
displayed trustworthy (compared to untrustworthy) behavior.
In Study 2, participants’ perceptions of the targets’
trustworthiness were examined before and after they learned
about the trustworthy or untrustworthy behavior of the positively
or negatively labeled targets. Importantly, an experimental
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manipulation was included that aimed at making fear of
exploitation salient to demonstrate that differential effects of
victim sensitivity are indeed causally attributable to differences
in people’s victim sensitivity. Thus, it is predicted that victim-
sensitive participants in the fear of exploitation condition
harbor more negative initial expectations toward targets
with negative social labels than victim-sensitive participants
in the control condition or victim-insensitive participants.
Given that higher victim sensitivity should be associated
with greater schema violation regarding dubious targets who
show trustworthy behavior (compared to dubious targets
who show untrustworthy behavior), changes in perceived
trustworthiness should be stronger for “trustworthy tricksters”
than for “untrustworthy tricksters” (i.e., selective updating).
Importantly, these effects should be more pronounced
in the fear of exploitation condition than in the control
condition.
STUDY 1
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from an undergraduate student pool
of a large German university. One data set was removed because
it turned out later the participant had participated twice in the
experiment. The remaining sample consisted of 104 students (68
women; MAge = 24, SDAge = 4).
Materials
Ninety pictures (512 × 768 pixels) of frontal male faces with a
neutral facial expression were selected from the FERET database
(Phillips et al., 1998). We only used faces that had received neutral
ratings of facial trustworthiness in a norming study (M = 3.28
on a scale ranging from 1 [not at all trustworthy] to 6 [very
trustworthy]; SD= 0.22).
In a separate norming study, 15 participants (MAge = 24,
SDAge = 2) rated the trustworthiness of 194 social labels using
a scale ranging from 1 (not at all trustworthy) to 6 (very
trustworthy). Out of these, 45 positive labels with a mean
trustworthiness of 4.43 (SD = 0.25) and 45 negative labels with
a mean trustworthiness of 1.92 (SD = 0.45) were selected as
stimulus material. Examples for positive labels are “scientist,”
“professor,” “firefighter,” and “ambulance driver;” examples for
negative labels were “trickster,” “Satanist,” “former prisoner,” or
“gang member.”
In yet another norming study, (N = 40, MAge = 28,
SDAge = 10), behavioral descriptions of trustworthy and
untrustworthy behaviors were rated on a scale ranging from
−3 (very untrustworthy) to +3 (very trustworthy). The 25
descriptions of untrustworthy behavior had a mean rating of
−2.22 (SD = 0.42), and the 25 descriptions of trustworthy
behavior had a mean rating of+1.89 (SD= 0.45). An example for
untrustworthy behavior is “He exploits the trust of older people
and steals valuable items from their apartments.” An example of
trustworthy behavior is “On his way home he once risked his life
to rescue a kid that fell into a frozen pond.”
Procedure
In the encoding phase, participants saw 50 male faces. The
faces were randomly assigned to 25 negative and 25 positive
labels. Each trial started with the presentation of a face. Below
the facial photograph, a label was presented (e.g., “F. D. is a
scientist,” or “S. D. is a trickster”). After 4.5 s, face and label
were complemented by a behavioral description. The behavioral
descriptions were randomly selected with the restriction that
the negative labels were paired with 15 untrustworthy and 10
trustworthy descriptions and the positive labels were paired with
15 trustworthy and 10 untrustworthy descriptions. Participants
were required to rate the likeability of the person, and then
initiated the next trial by clicking on a “continue” button.
Negative and positive social labels were paired with more valence-
congruent in comparison to valence-incongruent behaviors
because people’s negative or positive stereotypes should not
be blatantly disconfirmed by a high proportion of schema-
inconsistent pairings in the encoding phase.
Immediately after the encoding phase, participants received
instructions for a surprise source memory test, in which 80 facial
photographs were presented in a random order. Each face was
accompanied by a social label (i.e., “scientist,” “trickster”). Half
of the faces had been presented in the encoding phase. Ten faces
with negative labels had been described as untrustworthy, 10 faces
with negative labels had been described as trustworthy, 10 faces
with positive labels had been described as untrustworthy, and
10 faces with positive labels had been described as trustworthy.
Of the 40 new faces, 20 were accompanied by negative labels,
and 20 were accompanied by positive labels. The faces and labels
were randomly selected to be presented in either the encoding
phase or test phase. Faces and labels were randomly assigned to
conditions.
Each test trial started with the presentation of a face with a
label. After a 1.5 s interval, the likeability rating scale appeared
(ranging from 1 [not at all likeable] to 6 [very likeable]). After
rating the person’s likeability, the participants were asked to
indicate whether the face was old or new (had been presented
during the encoding phase or not). When the person had been
classified as old, participants were asked to indicate whether the
person was accompanied by a trustworthy or an untrustworthy
behavior description during the encoding phase. After the test
phase, participants completed a paper-and-pencil version of
Schmitt et al.’s justice sensitivity questionnaire (Schmitt et al.,
2010). Victim sensitivity was assessed with 10 items (Cronbach’s
α = 0.82). Example items are “It bothers me when others receive
something that ought to be mine” or “It makes me angry when
others receive a reward that I have earned.” Each item was rated
on a 6-point response scale ranging from 1 (not at all true) to 6
(absolutely true).
Design
A multinomial model was used to distinguish between old-
new recognition, source memory, and source guessing. Given an
estimated small effect of$ = 0.04 (estimated on the basis of pilot
studies), α= 0.05, and 80 answers in the source memory test, an N
of 104 is sufficient to detect an effect with a power of 1 – β= 0.95.
Power was calculated using G∗Power (Faul et al., 2007).
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Results and Discussion
Source Memory and Source Guessing
A multinomial source monitoring model (Bayen et al., 1996;
see Figure 1) was used to distinguish between guessing, source
memory, and old–new recognition. This model is well validated
(Bayen et al., 1996; Erdfelder et al., 2009), and has been used
in previous studies to disentangle the effects of schema (in-)
consistency on source guessing and source memory (Bayen and
Kuhlmann, 2011; Bell et al., 2015). The first tree represents
the processing tree of a face-label pair that was paired with
a description of untrustworthy behavior during the encoding
phase. With probability DC, participants recognize the face-
label combination as old. With the conditional probability dC,
source memory, that is, memory for the association of the face-
label combination with an untrustworthy behavior description,
is correctly remembered, in which case the participant is
able to correctly classify the person as a cheater. With the
complementary probability 1 – dC, the participant has no
source memory. In this case, the participant has to guess, with
probability g, that the person was described as a cheater, or,
with probability 1 – g, that the person was associated with
trustworthy behavior. With probability 1 – DC, the participant
fails to recognize the face-label combination as old, in which case
participants guess, with probability b, that the item is old, or, with
probability 1 – b, that the item is new. If the item is guessed to be
old, participants further guess, with probability g, that the person
was described as a cheater, or, with probability 1 – g, that the
person was described as trustworthy.
The other two trees represent the processing of face-label
combinations that were associated with trustworthy behavior
descriptions and face-label combinations that were new (only
presented at test), respectively. Model 5d of Bayen et al.’s
(1996) taxonomy of identifiable submodels, which includes the
restriction DC = DT = DNew, was used1. Two sets of the
processing trees displayed in Figure 1 are needed for the analysis
of the present data set, one for faces with negative labels,
and one for faces with positive labels. Parameter estimations
and goodness-of-fit tests were performed using multiTree
(Moshagen, 2010).
The base model provided a good fit to the data, G2(2) = 0.05,
p= 0.97. When no source memory was available, participants had
a higher probability of guessing that a person had been described
as a cheater when the social label was negative than when the label
was positive,1G2(1)= 6.72, p< 0.01. The estimates of the source
guessing parameter g and of the source memory parameter d are
reported in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.
Consistent with previous studies (Mieth et al., 2016),
participants showed an asymmetric expectancy violation effect.
For faces with negative labels, source memory was better
for the trustworthy behaviors in comparison to untrustworthy
behaviors, 1G2(1) = 4.74, p = 0.03. For faces with positive
1The hypothesis that DC =DT is supported by the available literature (e.g., Barclay
and Lalumière, 2006; Buchner et al., 2009), as well as by the present results.
Furthermore, the statistical comparisons do not change when using a base model
that does not make this assumption and simply assumes that DNew = (DC +DT)/2
(as in Bell et al., 2015).
labels, source memory did not differ as a function of behavior
type, 1G2(1) = 0.70, p = 0.40. This is clearly at odds with
the assumption of a negativity advantage, and suggests that
participants flexibly shifted their attention to information that
was unexpected and, therefore, most informative for them.
Victim Sensitivity
Next, we wanted to know how guessing and source memory were
affected by victim sensitivity. As reasoned in the introduction,
a priori it seemed possible that victim-sensitive persons would
show a particularly inflexible memory advantage for cheating
(Gollwitzer et al., 2012). The schema violation explanation,
however, would suggest that victim-sensitive persons would
show stronger negative social expectations based on the negative
social labels and, thus, stronger schema violation effects for
trustworthy tricksters (whereas for untrustworthy scientists no
difference in initial expectations due to victim sensitivity was
expected).
To analyze the influence of victim sensitivity, we followed the
exact same procedure as Mieth et al. (2016). Victim sensitivity
was dichotomized at its sample median (i.e., 2.9). Fifty-four
participants constituted the low victim sensitivity group, 50
constituted the high victim sensitivity group. These data were
analyzed together using separate model trees for individuals with
high and low victim sensitivity. The base model (incorporating
the same restrictions as the base model reported above) fit the
data well, G2(4) = 1.38, p = 0.85. More importantly, and in line
with our expectations, participants in the high victim sensitivity
group had a bias toward guessing that targets with negative labels
were more likely to be cheaters than targets with positive labels,
1G2(1)= 6.13, p= 0.01 (see Table 3).
When compared against a neutral baseline of guessing with
0.50 that the target was either described as a cheater or as a
trustworthy person, participants in the high victim sensitivity
group had a bias toward guessing that a target with a negative
label was associated with untrustworthy behavior,1G2(1)= 5.01,
p = 0.03, but no bias toward guessing that a target with a
positive label was associated with trustworthiness,1G2(1)= 1.38,
p = 0.24. Thus, the guessing bias of victim-sensitive participants
was stronger in the negative than in the positive direction.
Participants in the low victim sensitivity group, in contrast,
showed no such bias. Their tendency toward guessing that a
target was described as a cheater (when no source memory was
available) was not significantly affected by the negative or positive
social label, 1G2(1)= 1.63, p= 0.20.
In addition, participants in the high victim sensitivity group
had enhanced source memory for violations of their label-
based expectations—that is, for descriptions of trustworthiness
in comparison to descriptions of untrustworthiness when the
targets were associated with negative labels, 1G2(1) = 5.54,
p = 0.02 (see Table 4). As in the global analysis, there
was no difference between source memory for untrustworthy
and trustworthy descriptions when positive labels were used,
1G2(1)= 0.35, p= 0.55. Participants in the low victim sensitivity
group showed no such schema inconsistency advantage in
source memory. In fact, there was no difference between
untrustworthy and trustworthy descriptions, regardless of
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FIGURE 1 | Bayen et al.’s (1996) source memory model, adapted for the present study. Rounded rectangles on the left side represent the stimulus persons
(cheaters, trustworthy persons, and new persons). Letters along the branches represent the model parameters. D: probability that a person (a face with a label) is
correctly recognized as old or new. d: conditional probability that the context (untrustworthy or trustworthy behavior) is correctly remembered. b: conditional
probability of guessing that a person has been presented during the encoding phase. g: conditional probability of guessing that a person has previously been
associated with untrustworthy behavior.
TABLE 1 | Parameter estimates of the guessing bias parameter g
representing the conditional probability of guessing that the person was a
cheater rather than a trustworthy person as a function of label (Study 1).
Label Parameter
estimate
(SE) [0.95 Confidence Interval]
Negative 0.61 (0.05) [0.51 −0.71]
Positive 0.43 (0.04) [0.35 −0.52]
TABLE 2 | Parameter estimates of the source memory parameter d as a
function of label and behavior (Study 1).
Label Behavior Parameter
Estimate
(SE) [0.95 Confidence
Interval]
Negative Untrustworthy 0.27 (0.11) [0.05 −0.49]
Negative Trustworthy 0.57 (0.05) [0.48 −0.67]
Positive Untrustworthy 0.38 (0.06) [0.25 −0.50]
Positive Trustworthy 0.48 (0.07) [0.34 −0.62]
whether the labels were negative, 1G2(1) = 0.67, p = 0.41, or
positive, 1G2(1)= 0.33, p= 0.56.
In summary, Study 1 suggests that victim-sensitive compared
with victim-insensitive persons have stronger negative
expectations toward people associated with negative social labels,
as reflected in a bias toward guessing that targets with negative
labels have been associated with negative social behaviors. This
TABLE 3 | Parameter estimates of the guessing bias parameter g
representing the conditional probability of guessing that the person was a
cheater rather than a trustworthy person as a function of label and victim
sensitivity (Study 1).
Label Parameter
Estimate
(SE) [0.95 Confidence
Interval]
High victim sensitivity
Negative 0.67 (0.07) [0.53 −0.82]
Positive 0.42 (0.06) [0.30 −0.55]
Low victim sensitivity
Negative 0.56 (0.07) [0.42 −0.70]
Positive 0.44 (0.06) [0.32 −0.56]
finding nicely fits with prior research demonstrating that victim-
sensitive individuals are more likely to use untrustworthiness
cues than victim-insensitive individuals (Gollwitzer et al., 2012).
As hypothesized, the stronger initial influence of
untrustworthiness cues led to an “ironic” schema inconsistency
effect in the source memory of victim-sensitive individuals:
behavior that was inconsistent with the negative labels was
particularly well remembered as evidenced in better memory
for negative targets that violated rather than confirmed negative
expectations. Thus, victim sensitivity seems to be associated with
a reliance on negative expectations. This reliance on negative
expectations resulted in a schema-consistent guessing bias for
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TABLE 4 | Parameter estimates of the source memory parameter d as a
function of label, behavior and victim sensitivity (Study 1).
Label Behavior Parameter
estimate
(SE) [0.95 Confidence
Interval]
High victim sensitivity
Negative Untrustworthy 0.08 (0.23) [0.00 −0.53]
Negative Trustworthy 0.61 (0.06) [0.50 −0.73]
Positive Untrustworthy 0.37 (0.09) [0.19 −0.54]
Positive Trustworthy 0.48 (0.11) [0.27 −0.68]
Low victim sensitivity
Negative Untrustworthy 0.39 (0.12) [0.16 −0.62]
Negative Trustworthy 0.54 (0.08) [0.39 −0.68]
Positive Untrustworthy 0.39 (0.09) [0.22 −0.56]
Positive Trustworthy 0.49 (0.09) [0.30 −0.67]
negative labels. Moreover, the reliance on negative expectations
of victim-insensitive individuals enhanced source memory for
information that was inconsistent with these negative labels
relative to information that was consistent therewith (indeed
source memory for expectancy confirming negative targets was
extremely low). Thus, whereas victim-sensitive individuals would
probably prefer to remember targets well who behaved negatively
(i.e., “the unstrustworthy trickster” or “the unstrustworthy
scientist”), they are likely – due to strong initial negative
expectations regarding targets with a negative social label –
to remember those targets who surprised them by displaying
positive behavior.
One limitation of the present data analytic procedure needs
to be mentioned. Whereas the multinomial model is necessary to
distinguish between memory and guessing, it does not allow for a
direct test of interaction effects. Thus, testing “interaction effects”
requires running separate models in different subgroups. The
same approach has been used in previous source memory studies
(Bayen and Kuhlmann, 2011; Bell et al., 2015; Mieth et al., 2016).
Our present results suggest that being high in victim sensitivity
is not associated with better source memory for untrustworthy
behavior in general; rather, the results are more in line with
the idea that victim-sensitive individuals rely on their negative
schemata when guessing, and remember information that
violates their negative expectations. This evidence, however, is
indirect because (1) the analysis capitalized on group differences
in victim sensitivity, but did not experimentally manipulate fear
of exploitation, and (2) the dependent variable in Study 1 focused
on the outcome of an expectancy violation, but did not measure
intraindividual changes in the perception of trustworthiness after
an expectancy-inconsistent vs. expectancy-consistent behavioral
description has been provided.
To address these limitations, it seemed necessary to investigate
the influence of victim sensitivity on the effects of violations
of positive and negative expectations more directly. In Study 2,
therefore, participants’ person perception rather than their source
memory was examined in response to expectancy-congruent vs.
expectancy-incongruent information about the targets. To foster
the argument that differences in person perception are indeed
causally attributable to victim sensitivity as a personality trait
reflective of a latent fear of being exploited, an experimental
manipulation was introduced to activate victim sensitivity.
STUDY 2
Method
Participants and Design
Assuming α = β = 0.05 and an effect of φ2 = 0.25 regarding
the condition × victim sensitivity interaction on trustworthiness
perception in a multiple regression analysis, 54 observations were
needed. With a final sample size of 60, an effect of φ2 = 0.22 could
be detected. The final sample consisted of 60 students (51 women,
8 men, 1 non-response) of a German university (MAge = 22,
SDAge = 5). Participants were randomly assigned to one of two
conditions, the exploitation condition (n = 29) or the control
condition (n= 31; see below for details).
Materials
Fear of exploitation manipulation
Participants first read a short scenario. Their role in the scenario
varied depending on experimental conditions. Participants in
the exploitation condition were asked to imagine that they
would have to give a presentation with two fellow students in a
university course, and that they would receive a grade for their
presentation which was very important to them. What follows is
a summary of the scenario in the exploitation condition:
Your presentation is coming up soon and you and the two other
students agree to meet in the department library after the end of
the course to start with the literature search. However, the other two
do not show up, and you are forced to look for the literature on
your own. You eventually end up preparing the presentation all by
yourself, although you tried to contact the two other students. The
day before the presentation, the two others suddenly contact you
and ask what their part would be in the presentation. They excuse
themselves and say that they had been busy. The presentation itself
works out well until the lecturer assigns grades. Your two fellow
students receive better grades than you do although they barely
invested anything in the presentation, and, to make matters worse,
they do not object to this unjust grading. You are stupefied by the
behavior of your fellow students and you feel exploited and treated
unfairly.
Participants in the control condition read the same scenario,
but from the perspective of an observer. Both scenarios were
equal in length and varied only with regard to whether
participants imagined that the event befell them (exploitation
condition) or someone else (control condition). Thus, the
exploitation condition should activate participants’ victim
sensitivity (via imagining being exploited), whereas the control
condition should not have this effect given that someone else (but
not oneself) is the victim of injustice. The latter might activate
participants’ observer sensitivity (Schmitt et al., 2005), but not
their victim sensitivity.
Comprehension and manipulation check
Participants completed three items that assessed whether they
had difficulties understanding the scenario (“I read the text with
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 7 December 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 2037
fpsyg-07-02037 December 24, 2016 Time: 14:3 # 8
Süssenbach et al. Trustworthy Tricksters
full concentration,” M = 5.70, SD = 0.53; “I found it easy to read
the text,” M = 5.88, SD = 0.37; “I can describe the content of the
text,” M = 5.73, SD= 0.48; from 1 [not at all true] to 6 [absolutely
true]). As a manipulation check, participants responded to three
items that assessed moral outrage and anger in response to the
situation described in the scenario (“The situation described in
the text makes me upset;” “The situation described in the text
makes me angry;” “The situation described in the text bothers
me;” from 1 [not at all true] to 6 [absolutely true]; M = 4.92,
SD= 0.88, α= 0.88).
Trustworthiness perceptions
Next, participants viewed 24 male faces (faces, labels, and
behavioral descriptions were taken from the same sources as
in Study 1). Half of those were accompanied by positive social
labels; the others were accompanied by negative social labels.
Trustworthiness was assessed with two items (“How trustworthy
is this person?” and “How likeable is this person?” from 1 [not at
all] to 6 [very] that was always presented with a filler item (“How
competent is this person?” from 1 [not at all] to 6 [very]).
After rating the targets’ trustworthiness for the first time
(T1), participants viewed the same targets a second time (T2;
in a different order). This time, the targets came with a
behavioral description (trustworthy vs. untrustworthy behavior);
these descriptions were also taken from the same sources as
in Study 1. Nine faces with negative labels were paired with
untrustworthy behavior, nine faces with positive labels were
paired with trustworthy behavior, three faces with negative labels
were paired with trustworthy behavior, and three faces with
positive labels were paired with untrustworthy behavior.
Victim sensitivity
Finally, participants’ victim sensitivity was assessed with the same
10-item scale as in Study 1 (Schmitt et al., 2010; M = 4.23,
SD= 0.69, α= 0.80). Participants’ victim sensitivity did not differ
as a function of the experimental manipulation, t(58) = 0.75,
p= 0.45.
Results and Discussion
Manipulation Check
To test whether the experimental manipulation was successful,
a hierarchical regression analysis was conducted with condition
(0 = control, 1 = exploitation), victim sensitivity (mean-
centered), and the condition × victim sensitivity interaction
(entered in a second step) as predictor variables, and moral
outrage about the scenario as dependent variable. Neither victim
sensitivity, B = 0.28, t(57) = 1.72, p = 0.09, nor condition,
B = 0.19, t(57) = 0.91, p = 0.40, had main effects on moral
outrage, but the interaction effect was significant, B = 0.69,
t(56) = 2.20, p = 0.03, 1R2 = 0.074. We probed this interaction
using Hayes’s (2013) PROCESS macro. For people high in victim
sensitivity (1 SD above the sample mean), moral outrage scores
were significantly higher in the exploitation than in the control
condition, B = 0.67, t(56) = 2.18, p = 0.03, whereas for people
low in victim sensitivity (1 SD below the sample mean), the
difference between the two experimental conditions was not
significant, B=−0.29, t(56)=−0.94, p= 0.35. Stated differently,
victim sensitivity predicted moral outrage in the exploitation
condition, B = 0.59, t(56) = 2.79, p = 0.007, but not in the
control condition, B = −0.10, t(56) = −0.44, p = 0.66. Thus,
the experimental manipulation was successful in activating victim
sensitivity.
Trustworthiness Perceptions at T1
Participants’ trustworthiness perceptions were aggregated (1)
across the nine expectancy-confirming positive targets (positive
label plus trustworthy behavioral description), (2) across
the 9 expectancy-confirming negative targets (negative label
plus untrustworthy behavioral description), (3) across the
three expectancy-violating positive targets (positive label plus
untrustworthy behavior), and (4) across the three expectancy-
violating negative targets (negative label plus trustworthy
behavior). Mean trustworthiness perceptions are displayed in
Table 5.
The effects of experimental condition and victim sensitivity
on trustworthiness perceptions at T1 (i.e., without behavioral
descriptions) were tested via hierarchical multiple regression
analysis with condition (0 = control, 1 = exploitation),
victim sensitivity (mean-centered), and their interaction term
(entered in a second step) as predictors. These analyses were
conducted for targets with positive and targets with negative
labels, respectively. For targets with positive labels, neither
the experimental manipulation nor victim sensitivity (or their
interaction) influenced trustworthiness perceptions, all ps> 0.42.
For targets with negative social labels, however, trustworthiness
perceptions were significantly affected by victim sensitivity,
B = −0.28, t(57) = −2.16, p = 0.03, 1R2 = 0.071, condition,
B = −0.33, t(57) = −1.90, p = 0.06, 1R2 = 0.055, and their
interaction, B = −0.50, t(56) = 1.99, p = 0.05, 1R2 = 0.057
(see Figure 2, left panel). Probing this interaction further showed
that people high in victim sensitivity (1 SD above the sample
mean) gave significantly lower trustworthiness perceptions in
the exploitation than in the control condition, B = −0.68,
t(56) = −2.78, p = 0.007, whereas for people low in victim
sensitivity (1 SD below the sample mean), this effect was not
significant, B = 0.01, t(56) = 0.03, p = 0.97. Stated differently,
victim sensitivity predicted lower trustworthiness perceptions in
TABLE 5 | Descriptive findings for the trustworthiness perceptions at T1
and change in perceived trustworthiness at T2 (Study 2).
Measure N Items Mean SE
Label Behavior
Trustworthiness perceptions at T1
Negative 18 2.62 0.71
Negative 6 2.92 0.86
Positive 18 4.25 0.57
Positive 6 4.16 0.71
Difference score (T2-T1)
Negative Untrustworthy 18 −1.37 0.61
Negative Trustworthy 6 1.59 0.70
Positive Untrustworthy 6 −2.82 0.78
Positive Trustworthy 18 0.95 0.41
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FIGURE 2 | Effect of victim sensitivity and exploitation condition on initial trustworthiness perception (left) and change in trustworthiness (right) for
targets with a negative social label and a positive behavioral description. Higher values on change in trustworthiness reflect stronger change toward more
trustworthiness. Note that victim sensitivity was included as a continuous predictor in all analyses. Plotting the dependent variables at three levels of victim sensitivity
only serves to visualize the findings. VS = victim sensitivity.
the exploitation condition, B = −0.50, t(56) = −2.98, p = 0.004,
but not in the control condition, B = −0.00, t(56) = −0.01,
p= 0.99.
Changes in Trustworthiness Perceptions
To quantify participants’ responsiveness to behavioral
descriptions, a difference score was computed by subtracting
trustworthiness perceptions at T1 (without behavioral
descriptions) from their trustworthiness perceptions at T2
(with behavioral descriptions). Thus, positive values on the
difference score reflect an increase in perceived trustworthiness
at T2 relative to T1; negative values reflect a decrease. Multiple
regression analyses (see above) were conducted to analyze the
effect of our predictor variables on expectancy-violating targets.
Regarding expectancy-violating targets with a positive social
label (e.g., untrustworthy scientists), changes in trustworthiness
perceptions were neither predicted by condition, nor by
victim sensitivity, nor their interaction, all ps > 0.44.
However, regarding expectancy-violating targets with a
negative social label (e.g., trustworthy tricksters), changes in
perceived trustworthiness were significantly predicted by the
condition× victim sensitivity interaction, B= 0.62, t(56)= 2.37,
p = 0.02, 1R2 = 0.091 (see Figure 2, right panel). Probing
this interaction further revealed that people high in victim
sensitivity (1 SD above the sample mean) showed significantly
greater change in perceived trustworthiness in the exploitation
compared to the control condition, B = 0.50, t(56) = 1.98,
p= 0.05, whereas for people low in victim sensitivity (1 SD below
the sample mean), this effect was not significant, B = −0.35,
t(56)=−1.39, p= 0.17.
In a final step, we tested whether victim-sensitive compared
with victim-insensitive individuals indeed update their
expectations particularly when a target with a negative social
labels turns out to be trustworthy. To do so, a mixed model was
performed on participants’ absolute change scores regarding
their trustworthiness perception of negative targets who
violated versus confirmed negative expectations. No restriction
was imposed on the covariance matrix and parameters were
estimated using full maximum likelihood. This analysis yielded
a significant three-way interaction between type of target
(confirming vs. violating) × condition × victim sensitivity
(p = 0.008): Victim-sensitive individuals in the exploitation
condition updated their perceptions of negative targets who
violated their expectations (see the just reported results of the
multiple regression analyses for the direction of this updating),
but not of negative targets who confirmed them. Indeed, for
negative targets who confirmed negative expectations victim-
sensitivity was related to reduced updating of perceptions in
the exploitation condition, B = −0.38, t(52) = −2.66, p = 0.01,
whereas in the control condition victim sensitivity was unrelated
to changes in trustworthiness toward such targets, B = −0.02,
t(52)=−0.10, p= 0.92.
Thus, although participants high in victim sensitivity tend
to distrust targets with negative social labels initially, they are
more likely to selectively update their trustworthiness perception
after receiving expectancy-violating information relative to
participants low in victim sensitivity. This greater change in
perceived trustworthiness seems to reflect that, when fear of
exploitation is high, people are particularly responsive to the
violation of negative expectations. Moreover, the fact that victim
sensitivity predicted greater change in trustworthiness in the
condition that activated participants’ victim sensitivity is in line
with the argument that the observed sensitivity to a violation of
negative expectations is indeed causally attributable to differences
in participants’ fear of exploitation.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
When people are victim-sensitive, they are more receptive toward
cues associated with untrustworthiness, such as the interaction
partner’s facial expression or his or her background. So, when
fear of exploitation is high, negative social labels such as “X is
a trickster” have a stronger influence on one’s trustworthiness
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perception of X than a positive social labels such as “X is
a scientist.” This has been suggested by recent research on
victim sensitivity and suspicious cognition (see Gollwitzer and
Rothmund, 2009; Gollwitzer et al., 2013, for theoretical reviews).
The present study corroborates and extends these findings
by asking: what happens if an initial expectation regarding a
particular interaction partner is violated, that is, if a “trickster”
turns out to be trustworthy rather than untrustworthy? Here, a
“cheater detection” account (Cosmides and Tooby, 1989) would
predict that people are more likely to attend to (and remember)
the latter information. But recent research suggests that memory
advantages for cheaters are not as robust as evolutionary
psychology thought they would be. Source memory effects can
be better conceptualized as expectancy-violation effects than as
cheater detection effects (Bell and Buchner, 2012). Thus, it was
hypothesized that participants with a fear of exploitation would
not show enhanced memory accuracy for the untrustworthy
behavior of the trickster because untrustworthiness is already
part of their negative stereotype of a trickster. In contrast,
they should be more influenced by information that contradicts
their initial (negative) expectation. This asymmetric effect
should manifest in (a) better source memory and (b) increased
changes in trustworthiness perceptions for a negatively labeled
target that shows trustworthy behavior (i.e., the “trustworthy
trickster”) compared to a negatively labeled target that turns
out to be a cheater (i.e., the “untrustworthy trickster”). The
results of the two studies described in this paper confirm this
reasoning and, thus, contribute to and qualify research on
trustworthiness, suspiciousness, and source memory in social
interactions.
Victim Sensitivity and Asymmetric
Attendance to Untrustworthiness Cues
In previous studies (Suzuki and Suga, 2010; Bell et al.,
2012), it has been demonstrated that people rely on cues of
untrustworthiness in a person’s facial appearance if they do no
longer remember a person’s previous behavior. Consistent with
these findings, the social labels affected participants’ guessing
behavior in Study 1. If source memory was no longer available,
participants guessed that targets associated with negative social
labels had been associated with untrustworthy behavior more
often than guessing that targets associated with positive social
labels had been associated with trustworthy behavior. This
effect was only found among participants who were classified
as high in victim sensitivity and was not evident among
participants low in victim sensitivity. This finding confirms
and expands previous research on victim sensitivity, which
showed that victim-sensitive individuals are more likely than
victim-insensitive individuals to attend to social cues associated
with untrustworthiness rather than trustworthiness (Gollwitzer
et al., 2012). The crucial difference between this previous
research and the present experiments is that previous research
on asymmetrical attendance to untrustworthiness cues solely
relied on self-reports (about another person’s trustworthiness),
whereas the first study in the present article obtained evidence
for this effect in a much more unobtrusive measure: participants’
guessing in the absence of source memory. This finding lends
support to the “asymmetry hypothesis” formulated by Gollwitzer
et al. (2013) in their “Sensitivity to Mean Intentions” (SeMI)
model.
Victim Sensitivity and Asymmetrical
Effects on Expectancy-Inconsistent
Information
The finding that people high in victim sensitivity have a guessing
bias toward untrustworthiness after being confronted with
untrustworthiness-related cues is interesting in itself. However,
it takes us even one step further by answering the question
how people who fear to be exploited react to information that
violates their initial expectation about the trustworthiness of their
interaction partners.
Notably, the SeMI model does not make straightforward
predictions about how victim-sensitive individuals should
respond to persons who violate or confirm their initial
expectations. Considering that victim-sensitive individuals
experience particularly strong negative emotions when they
are exploited, it seemed possible that victim sensitivity may
lead to an inflexible memory advantage for cheaters. In other
words, it seemed possible that victim-sensitive compared with
victim-insensitive individuals recall that somebody turned out
to be a cheater more easily than the information that somebody
turned out to be a nice person.
In general, both types of information—the information
that someone is a cheater as well as the information that
someone is trustworthy—helps to decrease social uncertainty
which is experienced as aversive by victim-sensitive individuals.
When such information is available, remembering expectancy-
inconsistent information may be particularly useful for social
exchange. For instance, when people are in a situation in which
cooperation is low and cheating is common, they may be
extremely reluctant to cooperate with people whose previous
behavior is unknown. In this situation, it is not helpful for an
individual to remember particular instances of cheating because,
with or without this information, this individual will refuse to
cooperate (Barclay, 2008; Bell et al., 2010). Instead, it seems more
functional to focus on those few cases in which the behavior is
inconsistent with one’s expectations about a person. Given that
the effect of schema inconsistency on memory has been shown
to be a fairly general phenomenon (Bell and Buchner, 2012),
it seems possible that victim-sensitive individuals—due to their
increased negative expectations—may show increased processing
of information that specifically violates their negative views of
other persons.
In line with this latter prediction, participants in Study 1
demonstrated better source memory for behaviors that were
inconsistent with negative expectations than for behaviors that
were consistent with these expectations. This finding cannot be
explained by a cheater detection account, but it can be explained
by an expectancy inconsistency account. Moreover, Study 1
demonstrated that this expectancy inconsistency effect was
particularly evident for people high in victim sensitivity. These
people, however, showed no memory advantage for behaviors
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that violated positive stereotypes, which, at first glance, seems to
be at odds with the SeMI model: according to this model, realizing
that somebody is cheater although one expected this person
to be trustworthy should be particularly aversive to victim-
sensitive relative to victim-insensitive individuals. Interestingly,
prior research (Bell and Buchner, 2010) found that observer-
sensitive individuals (i.e., people with a true concern for the
just treatment of others) do have better source memory for
cheaters. In light of the present results and using an expectancy
inconsistency account of memory, this prior finding might be
better understood: whereas people high compared with people
low in victim sensitivity have biased expectations toward targets
associated with untrustworthiness, people high compared with
people low in observer sensitivity might harbor more positive
expectations toward targets associated with trustworthiness.
Hence, learning that the scientist is untrustworthy constitutes
a greater expectancy violation for the person high in observer
sensitivity, whereas learning that the trickster is trustworthy
constitutes a greater expectancy violation for the person high in
victim sensitivity (resulting in the findings presented here and the
ones observed by Bell and Buchner, 2010).
Results from Study 2 extended the findings observed on
participants’ source memory to participants’ trustworthiness
perceptions and provided experimental evidence in that regard.
In this study, victim-sensitive individuals whose fear of
exploitation was experimentally activated were more likely to
update their trustworthiness perceptions if a negatively labeled
target turned out to display trustworthy behavior. The opposite
effect, that is, updating trustworthiness ratings for a positively
labeled target who turned out to be a cheater, was not influenced
by being victim-sensitive or victim-insensitive in Study 2. Thus,
our results can be summarized as follows: victim-sensitive
individuals show asymmetric expectancy violation effects which
is evidenced in an asymmetric memory advantage for schema-
inconsistent information as well as an asymmetric change in
person perception.
Limitations
In the present studies, participants observed targets. Thus,
it is not clear whether similar effects on memory and
impression updating would be obtained if participants were the
actual recipients of trustworthy versus untrustworthy behavior.
However, research on cooperation in public goods games
demonstrated that victim sensitivity is a powerful predictor of
withholding contributions when cues of exploitation are present
(Gollwitzer and Rothmund, 2011). Therefore, there is good
reason to assume that victim sensitivity in terms of a fear of
exploitation does drive expectations and expectation violations
also in more interactive situations.
Another potential limitation pertains to the operationalization.
Participants only judged male targets. Hence, it is unclear
whether similar effects would be obtained for female targets.
Moreover, the majority of participants were female. However,
gender has only very small effects on victim sensitivity
(η2 = 0.002 in the validation study by Schmitt et al., 2010).
Finally, the present research demonstrates that victim-
sensitive individuals react more strongly to certain types of
expectancy violations. However, it is unclear which processes
involved in expectancy violations drive the observed effects.
Thus, whereas a purely cognitive process is possible in which
victim sensitivity exacerbates contrast effects by increasing the
difference in valence of the elements involved in the comparison
(Biernat, 2005), it is also conceivable that victim sensitivity
is related to greater feelings of surprise following expectancy
evaluations. Importantly, stronger surprise alone might suffice
to exacerbate contrast effects as it stimulates stronger sense-
making and cognitive mastering (see Noordewier et al., 2016 for
a temporal dynamics account of surprise).
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the present research supports the hypothesis that
victim sensitivity and therewith a fear of exploitation need not
result in an increase in response to cheating but may ironically
increase the processing of information that is inconsistent
with negative stereotypes and expectations. This finding cannot
be accounted for by a cheater detection explanation but
nicely fits an expectancy violation account—in which victim
sensitivity systematically affects participants’ initial schematic
expectations for dubious targets leading to stronger effects in
participants’ source memory and trustworthiness perceptions if
these expectations are not met. This might in fact be interpreted
as good news, as it suggests that even persons with a high
fear of exploitation are able to overcome their habitual negative
expectations toward their social environment when they are
confronted with more valid information about another person’s
trustworthiness.
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